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Abstract
Logit-response dynamics [AFN10] are a rich and natural class of noisy best-
response dynamics. In this work we revise the price of anarchy and the price of
stability by considering the quality of long-run equilibria in these dynamics. Our
results show that prior studies on simpler dynamics of this type can strongly depend
on a synchronous schedule of the players’ moves. In particular, a small noise by
itself is not enough to improve the quality of equilibria as soon as other very natural
schedules are used.
1 Introduction
Complex and distributed systems are often modeled by means of game dynamics in
which agents (players) act spontaneously, and typically attempt to maximize their own
benefit. These dynamics can be regarded as distributed algorithms that are implemented
by the players and have applications in Economics (e.g., markets), Physics (e.g., Ising
model and spin systems), Biology (e.g., evolution of life), and in Computer Science (e.g.,
distributed protocols for routing and resource allocations by competing entities). As a
result of such selfish behavior the system will reach some equilibrium that may or may
not be optimal. The price of anarchy (PoA) [KP09] and the price of stability
(PoS) [ADK+08] have been introduced to quantify the efficiency loss caused by the
players selfish behavior. Intuitively, the price of anarchy compares the worst possible
equilibrium to the optimum (the centrally designed outcome). Similarly, the price of
stability compares the best possible equilibrium with the optimum (to capture the loss
caused by the inherent instability of optimal outcomes). The PoA and the PoS measure
the performance of “decentralized and anarchic” distributed systems in which we simply
let the players decide by themselves how to play, until they reach some equilibrium.
∗Part of this work has been done while at LIAFA, Universite´ Paris Diderot, supported by the French
ANR Project DISPLEXITY.
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These two concepts seem naturally related to the question of explaining how the
players can choose between different equilibria. A remarkable observation made in game
theory is that noise allows the players to select good equilibria via a simple and natural
dynamics. Also, results on the PoA and PoS for certain problems are sometimes based
on equilibria that are “unnatural” because it is difficult for the players to reach or to
remain in such equilibria. This leads naturally to reconsider the bounds on the PoA and
PoS by restricting attention to “reasonable” equilibria.
In this work we follow this approach by considering the equilibria that arise in certain
natural noisy best-response dynamics. In these dynamics, players keep updating their
strategies and, at low noise regime, they tend to select strategies that deliver higher
payoffs (see Section 1.3 for the formal model). The equilibria that are selected in the
long-run are the so-called stochastically stable states. That is, the states that in the
stationary distribution have positive probability as the noise vanishes.1 One of the most
popular and studied of such dynamics is the following one:
Logit dynamics [Blu93]. At each time step one randomly chosen player up-
dates her strategy according to a noisy best-response rule.
On the one hand, for potential games, the long-run outcomes can be simply character-
ized as the Nash equilibria minimizing the potential of the game [Blu98]. On the other
hand these dynamics seem to require a particular schedule of the players’ moves (who is
allowed to update at each step and who stays put). The authors in [AFN10] analyze the
generalization in which players’ moves are not necessarily “synchronized”:
Independent learning logit-response dynamics [AFN10]. At each time step a
subset of randomly chosen players update their strategies according to a noisy
best response-rule (the same rule of logit dynamics). Every subset has some
positive probability of being selected (e.g., when every player independently
decides to revise his/her strategy with some probability p ∈ (0, 1)).
While the characterization of [Blu98] in terms of potential minimizers is no longer true,
[AFN10] characterize long-run outcomes as the states minimizing a stochastic potential.
This means that the set of equilibria selected by the two dynamics is different [AFN10].
It is therefore natural to ask to what extent the schedule of the players’ moves (the
revision process, in the game theory terminology) can affect the quality of the selected
equilibria in these dynamics. The logit-response dynamics has been proven to maintain
many of the nice properties of logit dynamics, including the selection of good equilibria in
coordination games, or convergence to Nash equilibria under certain conditions [AFN10,
MS12, CDGT14, AFN15].
1.1 Our Contribution
This work presents a refined version of the quality of equilibria in games (PoA and PoS)
based on ‘decentralized’ dynamics with noise, that is, the logit-response with independent
learning described above. This approach has two advantages:
1In this work we consider pure Nash equilibria, that is, states in which each player chooses one
strategy and unilateral deviations are not beneficial. In general games, stochastically stable states are
not necessarily Nash equilibria, even for the class of potential games (which is the main focus of this
work).
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1. It suggests an intuitive definition of ‘reasonable’ equilibria (robust to small mistakes
and easy to reach without specific schedules of players’ moves) to quantify the
efficiency loss.
2. It allows to understand the role of synchronization in such dynamics (prior studies
considered the quality of equilibria in ‘synchronous’ logit dynamics).
Specifically, we propose to study a natural concept of independent-logit PoA (and
PoS) which compares the worst (respectively, best) long-run outcomes of independent
learning logit-response dynamics with the optimum. That is, the classical PoA (respec-
tively, PoS) restricted to the set of stochastically stable states [AFN10]. The analogous
notions for logit dynamics, say the logit PoA and logit PoS, have been already stud-
ied in the literature under different names.2 A direct comparison between these notions
is informative of the importance of the schedule of the moves.
We study two classes of problems that have different features: load balancing games
which provide a simple model of congestion, and broadcast network design games in which
players share the cost of the used resources. Intuitively, in the first case players dislike to
choose the same resources (because this creates congestion and players experience some
delay), while in the second case they like to do the opposite (because the more players
use a resource the less each of them pays for it).
We first consider load balancing games whose analysis for logit dynamics has been done
by [AS09]. We obtain the tight bounds shown in Table 1 which illustrate of how different
the two dynamics can perform. In particular, though the prior bounds on logit dynamics
show that the quality of equilibria improves compared to “generic” Nash equilibria, the
opposite happens for independent-learning dynamics. This tells us that the improvement
of the quality of the equilibria is due to the combination of the players’ response rule
and of the possibility of synchronizing their moves. Thus, the bounds based on potential
minimizers are in general not “robust” in the sense that they depend critically on this
assumption. Also, contrary to logit dynamics, the stochastically stable states are not
necessarily Nash equilibria (in fact they are far from Nash equilibria in terms of cost).
We then consider broadcast network design games studied in [KM13, MM15] for
potential minimizers (logit dynamics), and show that in this case synchronization is
not essential to obtain optimal configurations. First, for the case of parallel links be-
tween a common source and a common destination (links represent resources of dif-
ferent costs) players will select the optimum if there is a unique shortest link (Theo-
rem 3.2). Note that in these instances the price of anarchy is rather high (PoA = n),
while our result says that the restriction to stochastically stable states is instead opti-
mal (independent-logit PoA = 1). Finally, we show that the result does not extend
to different sources since in some instances independent-logit PoA > logit PoA
(Theorem 3.1). Also in this case stochastically stable states are not Nash equilibria.
2[AS09] call the PoA restricted to potential minimizers Inefficiency Ratio of Stable Equilibria
(IRSE), while [KM13] use the terms Potential Optimal Price of Anarchy (POPoA) and of
Stability (POPoS). In this work we prefer to use the terms logit PoA and logit PoS to emphasize
the comparison between logit and independent-learning logit-response dynamics.
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Noise with Synchronization Deterministic Noise without Synchronization
Worst Equilibrium
logit PoA [AS09] PoA [FH79] independent-logit PoA
≥ 19/18 ≤ 3/2 2
(
1− 1
m+1
)
m
Best Equilibrium
logit PoS PoS independent-logit PoS
1 1 2
(
1− 1
m+1
)
Table 1: Bounds for load balancing games: The rightmost column contains our con-
tributions, and m denotes the number of machines. The bounds on (logit) PoS are
folklore.
1.2 Further Related Work
The impact of the schedule of the players’ moves on the quality of the equilibria has been
studied earlier. The approach by [MS12] is closely related to the one here, and it consists
of deriving sufficient conditions for which the stochastically stable states of logit-response
dynamics are the same as those of logit dynamics (potential minimizers). The impact
of simultaneous moves on (deterministic) best-response dynamics is studied by [FMS12].
The performance of various concurrent dynamics in which all players are active at each
time step is studied in e.g. [FKS10, ABFH09, KPT09, AFP+13].
Several works refine the PoA and the PoS by restricting to certain type of equilibria.
The price of stochastic anarchy by [CLPR08, CP09] is similar to ours in the sense that it
considers stochastically stable states though for a (concurrent) imitation dynamics. The
authors in [AS09] were the first to restrict to potential minimizers (the long-run equilibria
of logit dynamics) and their analysis on atomic congestion games and load balancing
games shows that prior bounds on the PoA for these games can be too pessimistic. The
work [KM13] extends this approach to the PoS and shows similar results for broadcast
network design games (where logit PoS = logit PoA up to a constant factor). The
restriction to the ring topology is considered in [MM15] (together with other variants of
PoS and PoA). The authors in [AFPP13] suggest to consider the expected social cost
in logit dynamics and therefore the stationary distribution as the equilibrium concept. A
new natural dynamics converging to Nash equilibria with optimal social welfare in general
games has been proposed in [PY12]. The robustness of the PoA and PoS bounds has
been investigated by [CKS11] and [Rou09] who considered approximate and correlated
equilibria, respectively.
Stochastic stability is the tool to show that in the coordination game players select the
risk dominant strategy (see [AFN10] for discussion and references). Recent works have
pointed out that in general revision processes (including independent-learning) logit-
response dynamics do not converge to Nash equilibria in potential games ([CDGT14,
AFN15] discuss this issue explicitly).
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1.3 Preliminary Definitions
This section introduces the necessary tools from [AFN10], while the next subsection
presents the revised PoA and PoS notions. Let ui(si, s−i) denote the utility of player
i when she chooses strategy si and the other players’ strategies are s−i (the latter is a
vector of strategies). The combination of all these strategies is a state s = (si, s−i). In
logit-response dynamics, whenever a player is given the opportunity to revise her strategy,
she will revise her current strategy with a strategy si chosen according to the logit choice
function
pi(si, s−i) =
eβui(si,s−i)∑
s′i∈Si
eβui(s
′
i,s−i)
(1)
where s−i is the current strategy profile (the strategies chosen by the others) and β is a
parameter representing the inverse level of noise in the players’ decision (0 < β < ∞),
and Si is the set of strategies of player i. The dynamics is defined as follows:
• Select a subset J of players according to a probability distribution q defined on the
subsets of players.
• Every selected player i ∈ J chooses a new strategy si with probability given by the
logit choice function (1).
Note that the dynamics depends on the revision process q, and different revision processes
yields different (logit-response) dynamics:
• Logit dynamics [Blu93, Blu98] correspond to asynchronous learning in which only
one player at the time is allowed to revise (i.e, q(J) > 0 if and only if J = {i} for
some i).
• In logit-response dynamics with independent learning every subset of players has
non-zero revising probability (i.e. q(J) > 0 for every subset J).
A state s is stochastically stable if it has positive probability in the limit invariant
distribution as the noise goes to zero,
lim
β→∞
µβ(s) > 0,
where µβ is the stationary distribution of the dynamics with parameter β.3
An edge (s, s′) is feasible if Rs,s′ := {J | q(J) > 0 and sk = s
′
k∀k 6∈ J} is non-empty
(note that Rs,s′ consists of the subsets of players potentially leading from s to s
′). For
any such feasible transition, its waste is defined as
Ws,s′ := min
J∈Rs,s′
W
(J)
s,s′ , where
W
(J)
s,s′ :=
∑
j∈J
(
max
s′′
j
∈Sj
uj(s
′′
j , s−j)− uj(s
′
j , s−j)
)
.
3It is well known that the dynamics described above define an ergodic Markov chain over the possible
strategy profiles for every 0 < β <∞. That is, the stationary distribution µβ exists for all β.
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The waste of a directed tree (or of path) T is simply the sum of the waste of its edges:
W (T ) :=
∑
(s,s′)∈T
Ws,s′.
The stochastic potential of a state s is
W (s) := min
T∈T (s)
W (T )
where T (s) is the set of all directed trees T in which every state s′′ has a unique path to
s. That is, T is a tree directed towards s with each edge being feasible.
Theorem 1.1 ([AFN10]). Consider the logit-response dynamics (with any revision pro-
cess). A state is stochastically stable if and only if it minimizes W (s) among all states.
It has been observed recently that, even for potential games4, stochastically stable
states are not necessarily Nash equilibria [CDGT14, AFN15].
In our proofs we shall find it convenient to reason about the existence of zero-waste
paths between two states. Note that a zero-waste transition (s, s′) corresponds to a
multiple best-response: Since W
(J)
s,s′ = 0 all players in J simultaneously best-respond to
the strategies in s and the resulting profile is s′ (for J = {i} we have a best-response).
1.3.1 Revised Price of Anarchy and Stability
We want to quantify the efficiency loss that occurs when we relax logit dynamics to inde-
pendent learning revision processes. Note that the set of stochastically stable states does
not depend on the particular revision process q satisfying the definition of independent
learning (the stochastic potential depends only on the feasible transitions which do not
change if q and q′ are both independent learning revision processes). Given an instance I
(a game) of interests, and a corresponding global cost function cost mapping states into
a nonnegative real, we define the following
independent-logit PoA(I) =
maxs∈STABLE cost(s, I)
mins cost(s, I)
where STABLE denotes the stochastically stable states for the logit-response dynam-
ics with independent learning. By replacing ‘max’ with ‘min’ we obtain the notion
of independent-logit PoS. The original PoA and PoS are defined by replacing
STABLE with the set of all possible Nash equilibria. The restriction to logit dynamics,
logit-PoA and logit-PoS, have STABLE equal to the states minimizing the potential
of the game. We generally consider classes of games and extend both definitions by taking
the supremum over all instances: For a class of games C the independent-logit PoA
is defined as supI∈C independent-logit PoA(I); independent-logit PoA is defined
as supI∈C independent-logit PoS(I).
The following easy result (whose elementary proof is given in Appendix A.1) is useful
for games in which convergence to Nash equilibria is not guaranteed (like those considered
here).
4In this work we deal only with weighted potential games, that is, games that admit a vector w and
a potential function φ such that ui(s)− ui(s
′) = (φ(s′)− φ(s))wi for all i and for all s and s
′ that differ
in exactly player i’s strategy.
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Theorem 1.2. For any game, the set of stochastically stable states in independent learn-
ing logit-response dynamics must contain at least one Nash equilibrium. Therefore
independent-logit PoS ≤ PoA.
2 Load Balancing Games
We consider the load balancing problem which is defined as follows. There arem identical
machines and n jobs, each job having its own weight. Each job is controlled by a player
who can choose one machine (strategy). The strategies determine an allocation and the
load for each machine (sum of the weights of jobs allocated to the machine). Naturally,
each player aims at having her job on a machine with minimal load (so the payoff is
defined as the negative of the load of the chosen machine). The cost of an allocation is
the so-called makespan, that is, the maximum load over all machines.
2.1 Independent Logit PoA
In this section we show that the PoA in independent learning dynamics can be much
worse than all prior bounds. In particular, it is higher than the classical PoA which
considers any Nash equilibria. This means that there are some stochastically stable
states which are not Nash equilibria for this potential game.
Theorem 2.1. For load balancing games,
independent-logit PoA = m.
Proof. Since the upper bound is trivial, we shall prove only the lower bound. Consider
the instance with m machines and n = lm − 1 identical jobs (say of size 1), for a large
positive integer l. The optimum has cost l and it is given by any allocation in which one
machine has l − 1 jobs, and all other machines have l jobs.
We claim that every state is stochastically stable, including those in which all jobs
go to the same machine (and whose cost is thus lm− 1). To prove our claim, we observe
that in every state s there is at least one machine mhigh with at least l jobs and another
machine mlow with at most l − 1 jobs. This implies that we can construct a zero-waste
path from any state s to every other state s′ as follows:
1. First all jobs in machine mhigh move to machine mlow;
2. Now that machine mhigh is empty, all jobs move there;
3. Then from there all jobs move to the machine they occupy in s′ (some do not move
because they are already in the correct machine).
Note that each move is a best-response made simultaneously by a subset J of players
(because players move to a machine with strictly lower load). Therefore each of the three
transitions has zero waste. Since the stochastically stable state with all jobs in the same
machine costs lm− 1, and the optimum is l, we have shown that
independent-logit PoA ≥ m− 1/l
for all l. The theorem thus follows by taking l large enough.
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2.2 Independent Logit PoS
In this section we show a tight bound on the independent-logit PoS.
The strategy to prove that a certain state is not stochastically stable is to prove that
it is “easy” to leave this state. That is, there exists a tree of small waste which is directed
from this state to all other states. The next lemma says that such a tree can be obtained
by finding a small-waste path leading to a state in which one machine has zero load.
Lemma 2.2. Let s be an allocation in which one machine has zero load. Then there
exists a zero-waste path from s to every other state.
The proof of this lemma is exactly the same argument used in the proof of Theorem 2.1
above (Items 2-3). Next, we introduce some additional notation that will ease the proofs
below.
Compact notation for states and jobs allocations. Given a set of jobs weights, we
partition these weights among the machines, without distinguishing among the machines
and among players having identical weights. This results in a class of states having the
same cost. For instance, for jobs of size {2, 1, 1, 1} the partition
[2], [1, 1], [1]
denotes a class of allocations in which one machine gets a job of size 2, does not matter
which of the three machines, another machine gets two out of the three jobs of size 1, and
the remaining machine gets the remaining job of size 1. An explicit representation would
be in terms of which player goes to which machine: for players {p1, p2, p3, p4} = {2, 1, 1, 1}
the states
[p1], [p2, p3], [p4], [p1], [p2, p4], [p3], [p1], [p3, p4], [p1], . . . . . . [p4], [p2, p3], [p1]
correspond to the partition [2], [1, 1], [1]. Finally, we call a job of size s an s-job.
Theorem 2.3. For load balancing games,
independent-logit PoS ≥ 2
(
1−
1
m+ 1
)
.
Proof. Consider instances with m machines and jobs
{∆− δ,∆− δ,∆, . . . ,∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−2
, δ, . . . , δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
lm
}
where l is a (sufficiently large) positive integer and
∆ =
m
m+ 1
, and δ =
∆
lm
.
First, optimal allocations have cost 1 and can be obtained (only) by allocating one large
job (size ∆ or ∆− δ) in each machine as follows:
[∆− δ, δ, . . . , δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
], [∆− δ, δ, . . . , δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
], [∆, δ, . . . , δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
], . . . , [∆, δ, . . . , δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
]. (2)
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(Note that ∆ + lδ = 1 and the cost is indeed 1.)
Second, there are Nash equilibria of cost 2(∆− δ) which are of the form
[∆− δ,∆− δ], [δ, . . . , δ], [∆], . . . , [∆]. (3)
We shall prove that only allocations of cost 2(∆ − δ) are stochastically stable, thus
implying
independent-logit PoS ≥ 2(∆− δ) = 2
(
1−
1
m+ 1
− δ
)
.
The theorem thus follows by taking δ arbitrarily small, i.e., l arbitrarily large.
Claim 2.4. Every allocation with one large job per machine has a zero-waste path to
every other state.
Proof of Claim. In any allocation that allocates one large job per machine, there exists
a machine with load at most ∆− δ+ lδ = 1− δ. The following sequence of best-response
moves leads to another allocation with one machine having zero load:
[∆− δ, δ, . . . , δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
], [∆− δ, δ, . . . , δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
], [∆, δ, . . . , δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
], . . . , [∆, δ, . . . , δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
] →
[∆− δ, δ, . . . , δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
], [∆− δ, δ, . . . , δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
l(m−1)
], [∆], . . . , [∆] →
[∆− δ], [∆− δ], [∆], . . ., [∆, δ, . . . , δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
lm
] →
[∆− δ,∆, δ, . . . , δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
lm
], [∆− δ], [∆], . . ., [empty]
The claim then follows by Lemma 2.2.
Claim 2.5. Every Nash equilibrium of cost 2(∆− δ) requires a minimal waste of δ and
there exists a path of waste δ from such an equilibrium to every other state.
Proof of Claim. Every Nash equilibrium of cost 2(∆− δ) must allocate two (∆− δ)-jobs
to the same machine and thus it must be of the form:
[∆− δ,∆− δ], [δ, . . . , δ], [∆], . . . , [∆].
Since the machine containing all δ-jobs has load ∆, every move of one (or more) job(s)
requires a waste of δ or larger. To get a path of waste δ, consider the following transitions:
[∆− δ,∆− δ], [δ, . . . , δ], [∆], . . . ,[∆]
(waste=δ)
→
[∆− δ], [∆− δ, δ, . . . , δ], [∆], . . . ,[∆]
(waste=0)
→
[∆− δ,∆− δ, δ, . . . , δ], [empty], [∆], . . . ,[∆]
and apply Lemma 2.2 to obtain the rest of the path.
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To prove the theorem, let APX denote the approximate allocations of the form (3).
We use the two claims above to prove that for every s 6∈ APX
W (s) ≥ |APX|δ (4)
while for every sapx ∈ APX
W (sapx) ≤ (|APX|−1)δ (5)
Inequality (4) follows from the fact that every state in APX requires a waste of δ to leave,
thus any tree towards s must have waste |APX|δ. For (5), we argue as follows. First we
build a partial tree from the |APX|−1 states in APX to sapx. Second, we observe that
every non-Nash equilibrium has a zero-waste path to some Nash equilibrium. Third, we
show that set of all Nash equilibria is the union of APX and OPT , where OPT are the
allocations of cost 1 (details in Appendix A.2). Then, by Claim 2.4, the paths from OPT
to sapx have zero waste.
A matching upper bound follows from the known upper bound on PoA (see Table 1)
and the fact that independent-logit PoS ≤ PoA (Theorem 1.2).
Corollary 2.6. For load balancing games,
independent-logit PoS = 2
(
1−
1
m+ 1
)
.
3 Broadcast Network Design Games
In this section we consider broadcast network design games studied in [KM13, MM15].
In these games, we are given a network in which edges have costs, and a set of players
located in some of the nodes. The players aim at connecting to a common terminal node
t and their strategy is to choose which route to use. The cost of each edge is then shared
equally among all players using that edge: if ne players select a route containing edge e
then each of them pays a share ce/ne of the cost ce of the edge. The cost for a player is
the sum of the shares of the edges contained in the chosen route, and the social cost is
the sum of the costs of the used edges.
Figure 1 shows an example from [KM13] in which s1 and s2 denote the two players
(their locations). We use this instance to show that also in these games synchronization
is important for the quality of equilibria.
Theorem 3.1. There exists an instance I of a broadcast network design game for which
PoA(I) = 4/3 but
independent-logit PoA(I) = 5/3.
In particular, some non-Nash equilibrium is stochastically stable.
Proof. Consider the instance in Figure 1. Each player has two strategies and therefore
there are only four possible states shown in Figure 1. Note that the Nash equilibria are
s1, s2 and s3, and s1 and s3 can be obtained from s2 by a move of a single player whose
cost remains 2 in both cases (thus the move is a best-response). Therefore, transitions
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22
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3
Figure 1: On the left, an instance of broadcast network design game for which a non-
Nash equilibrium is also stochastically stable. On the right, the possible states for this
instance (think arrows represent zero-waste transitions).
(s2, s1) and (s2, s3) are zero-waste transitions. Moreover, starting from s2, if both players
move we obtain state s0 and again a zero-waste transition (s2, s0) (being each move a best-
response). Finally, transitions from s0 to any Nash equilibrium are zero-waste because
the player(s) changing strategy actually improve. Since all transitions are zero-waste, we
have W (s) = 0 for all four states and therefore s0 is stochastically stable. Since the cost
of s0 is 5 and the optimum is 3, the theorem follows.
We next consider broadcast network design games over parallel links : All players
are located on the same node s and the graph consists of m parallel links (representing
resources of different costs) connecting to the common target t. Let ℓ1 ≤ ℓ2 ≤ · · · ≤ ℓm
be the costs of the links, and let Nk denote the state in which all players choose the k
th
link in the order above (in particular N1 is optimal and also a Nash equilibrium). The
following result provides sufficient conditions for which the dynamics will select only the
optimum.
Theorem 3.2. For network broadcast games over parallel links, if there is a unique
shortest link (ℓ1 < ℓ2) or all links have the same cost then
independent-logit PoA = 1.
The proof uses the following radius-coradius argument from [AFN10]. The basin of
attraction of a state s is the set B(s) of all states s′ such that there is a zero-waste path
from s to s′. The radius R(s) is the minimum number r such that there is a path of
waste r from s to some s′ 6∈ B(s). The coradius CR(s) is the minimum number cr such
that, for every s′′ 6∈ R(s), there is a path of waste at most cr from s′′ to s.
Lemma 3.3 ([AFN10]). If R(s) > CR(s), then the set of stochastically stable states are
exactly those in L(s), where L(s) is the set of s′ ∈ B(s) for which s ∈ B(s′).
We next apply this result to our problem.
Lemma 3.4. R(N1) − CR(N1) = (ℓ2 − ℓ1)H(n), where H(n) = 1 + 1/2 + · · · + 1/n is
the harmonic function.
Proof. Let b1 be the smallest positive integer such that if link 1 is chosen by at least b1
players, then moving to link 1 is a best-response for all other players. That is
ℓ1
b1 + 1
≤
ℓ2
n− b1
.
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Claim 3.5. R(N1) ≥
(
ℓ2 −
ℓ1
n
)
+
(
ℓ2
2
− ℓ1
n−1
)
+ · · ·+
(
ℓ2
n−b1
− ℓ1
b1−1
)
.
Proof of Claim. By definition of b1, in order to reach a state not in B(N1) we have to
move n− b1+1 players from link 1. The minimal waste path for achieving this is to move
these players one by one and all to link 2. Note that the kth move has waste ℓ2
k
− ℓ1
n−k+2
and
the last move (k = n− b1 +1) has zero waste by definition of b1: indeed
ℓ1
b1
> ℓ2
n−b1+1
.
Claim 3.6. CR(N1) ≤
(
ℓ1 −
ℓ2
n
)
+
(
ℓ1
2
− ℓ2
n−1
)
+ · · ·+
(
ℓ1
b1
− ℓ2
n−b1+1
)
Proof of Claim. By definition of b1, starting from any state, it is enough to move at most
b1 players into link 1 to obtain a state is in B(N1). We move players one by one. Suppose
first that initially ℓ1 contains no players. Then the k
th move has waste ℓ1
k
−
ℓjk
njk
, where
ℓjk 6= ℓ1 is the link of the k
th player we move, and njk is the number of players currently
in that link. Since ℓjk ≥ ℓ2 and njk ≤ n− k+1 (link 1 contains k− 1 before this move is
done), the waste of each move is upper bounded by ℓ1
k
− ℓ2
n−k+1
and a total of b1 moves is
enough. This gives the upper bound in the claim. Finally, if ℓ1 already contained some
players in the initial state, then an even smaller waste is sufficient (it suffice to consider
the first n1 moves above as already done, where n1 is the initial number of players in
ℓ1).
By combining the two claims above and rearranging terms, we get R(N1)−CR(N1) ≥
ℓ2 +
ℓ2
2
+ · · ·+ ℓ2
n
− (ℓ1 +
ℓ1
2
+ · · ·+ ℓ1
n
), which proves the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. If all links have the same cost (ℓ1 = ℓm) then every state Nk
is optimal. Since these states are also strict Nash equilibrium, the convergence result
in [AFN15] says that the stochastically stable states are contained in these strict Nash
equilibria (formally, the game is weakly acyclic since every other state is not a Nash
equilibrium).
Now consider the case in which there is only one optimal link (ℓ1 < ℓ2), then we have
R(N1) > CR(N1) by Lemma 3.4. Moreover L(N1) = {N1} since this is a strict Nash
equilibrium. We can thus apply Lemma 3.3.
4 Conclusion and Open Questions
In this work we have studied a refinement of the PoA and PoS based on the long-run
equilibria in a general noisy best-response dynamics (a generalization of logit dynamics).
The analysis is based on the characterization by [AFN10] and it provides new insights
on the importance of the order in which players revise their strategies. On the one hand,
restricting the analysis only to potential minimizers may not be significant for other
natural dynamics of the same type. On the other hand, a comparison between the two
dynamics is useful to understand the importance of synchronous moves.
We remark that, in load balancing games, the bounds for independent learning logit-
response dynamics are in a sense the worst possible. First, m is an upper bound to any
configuration, and therefore independent-logit PoA ≤ m. Second, in every game we
have independent-logit PoS ≤ PoA (see Theorem 1.2). In load balancing games
both inequalities are tight.
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A natural alternative would be to consider the expected cost at stationary distribution
[AFPP13]. Here the main technical difficulty lies in obtaining the stationary distribution
(see e.g. [AFP+13] for such an issue). The advantage of stochastic stability is that
it avoids an explicit computation of the stationary distribution. However, the resulting
bounds can be considered too pessimistic in some cases. For instance, when each player is
selected for revising her strategy with probability p sufficiently small, the dynamics should
be close to the logit dynamics. [MS12] suggest to reduce to potential minimizers, that is,
to show that stochastically stable states are potential minimizers also for logit-response
dynamics with more general revision processes. We note that this approach requires
additional hypothesis on the game (or on the players behavior). In particular, one should
assume that players have a unique best response to have convergence to Nash equilibria
[CDGT14, AFN15]. In this case, one gets independent-logit PoA ≤ PoA, and in
some cases the results of [MS12] say that independent-logit PoA ≤ logit PoA.
The study of other problems considered in [AS09, KM13, MM15] is an interesting
direction for future research. Some of these bounds on potential minimizers are already
quite sophisticated, and stochastic stability in independent learning may require non-
trivial analysis. Estimating independent-logit PoA and PoS is still open even for
ring networks [MM15].
Acknowledgments. I am grateful to Francesco Pasquale for comments on an earlier
version of this work, and to Carlos Alos-Ferrer for bringing [CDGT14, AFN15] to my
attention.
A Postponed Proofs and Additional Details
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1.2
Observe that for any state s¯ which is not a Nash equilibrium there exists a sequence
of best-response moves that reaches some Nash equilibrium s. That is, there exists a
zero-waste path from any non-Nash s¯ to some Nash s.
This implies that W (s¯) ≥ W (s) because any waste tree directed to s¯ can be trans-
formed into a tree of no larger waste directed into s (by adding the path mentioned above
and removing other transitions). This shows that the waste W (s¯) cannot be smaller than
the waste of all Nash equilibria.
A.2 Postponed Details for the Proof of Theorem 2.3
We need to prove that the set of all Nash equilibria is just the union of OPT and APX ,
that is, the allocations of the form (2) and (3), respectively.
We first show that any allocation with a machine containing a ∆-job and another
large job (size ∆ or ∆ − δ) cannot be a Nash equilibrium. To be a Nash equilibrium,
the load of every other machine should be at least ∆. This will not be possible given the
remaining jobs: If we have a machine with a ∆-job and ∆− δ-job, then the jobs that are
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left for the other m− 1 machines are
{∆− δ,∆, . . . ,∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−3
, δ, . . . , δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
lm
}
where the δ-jobs sum up to ∆. Thus the total load we can distribute is (m − 1)∆ − δ,
and some machine will have load less than ∆. The same holds if we start with a machine
having two ∆-jobs.
Finally, we show that every allocation with one large job per machine has a zero-waste
path to some allocation in OPT . Indeed, allocations with one large job per machine are
of the form
[∆− δ, δ, . . . , δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
k1
], [∆− δ, δ, . . . , δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
k2
], [∆, δ, . . . , δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
k3
], . . . , [∆, δ, . . . , δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
km
]. (6)
To obtain an allocation in OPT it is enough to move the δ-jobs from higher load machines
to lower load machines (or to machines with the same load), until we obtain k1 = · · · =
km = l, that is (2).
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